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Existing literature is inconclusive about the relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors as it assumes,
implicitly, that this relationship is direct. An alternative perspective, that has received less attention in the literature, is that this
relationship can be mediated by other contextual variables such as ﬁnancial performance. Thus, this study is aiming to provide
some empirical evidence on this issue that may help in explaining divergence in prior work. Panel data regression was performed
on a sample that includes all ﬁrms that are listed in the Egyptian social responsibility index during the period from 2007 to 2010.
The results demonstrate that better (or worse) ﬁnancial performance, and rather social responsibility, is the lead for institutional
investors when they make their investment decisions.
& 2015 Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, Future University. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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The possibility that ﬁrms can develop a competitive edge over rivals by investing in social responsibility has been
made increasingly likely over recent years by changes in investors' behavior and attitudes towards the society
(Graves & Waddock, 1994; Saleh, Zulkiﬂi, & Muhamad, 2010; Wahba, 2008b; Wahba & Elsayed, 2014a).
As such, the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is ever more on the agenda of business organizations.
Despite literature suggests different deﬁnitions of CSR, generally, it refers to “the ﬁrm's consideration of and
response to issues beyond the narrow economic, technical and legal requirements of the ﬁrm to accomplish social
beneﬁts along with the traditional economic gains which the ﬁrm seeks” (Davis, 1973, p. 313).
Change in corporate ownership structure with an increase in the stakes of institutional investors such as banks,
mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds (Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, & Rechner, 2005) has motivated/10.1016/j.fbj.2015.02.001
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prior work has presented two contested perspectives. The ﬁrst perspective argues for a positive relationship between
social responsibility and institutional investors. The underlying premise of this argument is that since institutional
investors are risk-averse (Mahoney & Roberts, 2007), and ﬁrm's reputation in social and environmental responsibility
reduces stocks' volatilities (Petersen & Vredenburg, 2009), ﬁrms that invest in social programs and initiatives will be
able to attract more institutional investors (Graves & Waddock, 1994). The other perspective argues for a negative
relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors on the basis that social responsibility orientation
does not match with institutional investors' investment horizon. In other words, because investing in social
responsibility programs and initiatives is likely to lead to considerable costs in the short term (Hart & Ahuja, 1996)
and the market often responses to social responsibility initiatives in the long-term (Shank, Manullang, & Hill, 2005),
institutional investors are less likely to prefer socially responsible ﬁrms. This is because short-term performance
cycles discourage them from supporting long-term projects as institutional investors mainly prefer near-term earnings
(Bushee, 2001; Koh, 2003). In a similar vein, empirical studies that have examined the relationship between social
responsibility and institutional investors offer inconclusive evidence (Coffey & Fryxell, 1991; Cox, Brammer, &
Millington, 2004; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Mahoney & Roberts, 2007; Saleh et al., 2010; Wahba, 2008b, 2010).
Indeed, existing literature can be challenged due to its implied and simplest conjecture that the relationship
between social responsibility and institutional investors is a direct relationship. Opposing and mixed ﬁndings in prior
studies may be traced back to the fact that this relationship is not a direct relationship. Rather, this relationship can be
mediated by other contextual variables such as ﬁnancial performance, a point that has received less attention in
literature. Speciﬁcally, the main argument in this paper is that better (or worse) ﬁnancial performance, and rather
social responsibility, may, in turn, be the guide for institutional investors when they make their investment decisions.
This is because, “while the emergence of social criteria may inﬂuence institutional investment activity, these criteria
probably remain subordinate to economic criteria” (Coffey & Fryxell, 1991, p. 439). For instance, although many
investors value social responsibility, ﬁnancial performance is still their main concern (Matterson, 2000). Moreover,
not only ﬁnancial returns are important for ethical investors (Sparkes, 1998), but also institutional investors do not
consider social responsibility data unless they are presented in a “ﬁnancial form” (Teoh & Shiu, 1990).
Thus, this study is designed to add to corporate ﬁnance as well as social responsibility literature in two ways.
It seeks to explain the divergence in existing literature by examining the mediating effect of ﬁnancial performance on
the relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors. Moreover, it adds to our understanding by
conducting research on a sample of ﬁrms from Egypt as a developing country, where much of the existing evidence
reﬂects the context of developed countries. Presenting evidence from other less developed countries assists in
developing existing theories of corporate ﬁnance as well as corporate social responsibility, as it may not be applicable
to generalize conclusions from prior studies on other organizations that work in different cultures (Elsayed & Wahba,
2013).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The second section is devoted to presenting existing theoretical and
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors. Hypothesis
development is introduced in the third section. Sample and variables measurement is presented in the fourth section.
Econometric analysis is found in the ﬁfth section. The ﬁnal section is designated to introduce conclusion and
implications of the main ﬁndings.
2. Social responsibility and institutional investors
Undoubtedly, the past few decades have witnessed a noticeable change in corporate ownership structure with an
increase in the stakes of institutional investors such as banks, mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds
(Sundaramurthy et al., 2005). Institutional investors, according to the risk aversion theory, are rational investors who
search for efﬁcient investment by taking into account risk and return that associated with any proposed investment.
Thus, they may consider corporate social initiatives and programs as a means to reduce potential risk (Wahba,
2008b). This is likely to occur as reputation in social and environmental activities may lower stock volatilities
(Petersen & Vredenburg, 2009). Therefore, the net impact of social responsibility on institutional ownership,
according to this perspective, is expected to be positive. In other words, ﬁrms that invest more in building its social
reputation will be able to attract more institutional investors (Wahba, 2010; Wahba & Elsayed, 2014a). Conversely,
institutional investors, according to the theory of myopic institutions (Hansen & Hill, 1991), are considered as
H. Wahba, K. Elsayed / Future Business Journal 1 (2015) 1–12 3shortsighted investors who concern only with short-term return, as managers of these institutions are evaluated and
compensated on their short-term results (Cox et al., 2004; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Michelson, Wailes, Laan, &
Forst, 2004). Since, investment in social programs and activities is a long-term decision that needs time to gain cost
savings (Mahoney & Thorne, 2005), organizations that invest in social responsibility will not be able to attract more
institutional investors. Accordingly, this assertion implies that corporate social responsibility affects institutional
investors negatively (Wahba, 2010).
Empirical studies that examined the relationship between corporate social responsibility and institutional investors
also present opposing ﬁndings. For instance, Teoh and Shiu (1990) showed that available data on corporate social
responsibility in company reports have no impact on decisions of institutional investors. Coffey and Fryxell (1991)
did not ﬁnd a clear pattern regarding this relationship. Graves and Waddock (1994) and Cox et al. (2004) pointed out
that institutional investors invest in socially responsible ﬁrms. Mahoney and Roberts (2007) as well as Saleh et al.
(2010) found that ﬁrms are able to attract and maintain their institutional investors while they engage in social
initiatives and programs.
In the Egyptian context, existing evidence regarding the relationship between social responsibility and ownership
structure is limited. For instance, El-Zayat, Ibraheem, and Kandil (2006) pointed out that although Egyptian ﬁrms
have a positive attitude toward environmental issues, existing practices are less effective and compliance with
environmental regulations is minimal. They traced this ﬁnding back to the “soft” introduction of environmental
regulations from the government side and the “soft” implementation of environmental mandates from the side of
business organizations. Moreover, in surveying environmentally reporting practices using 60 annual reports in nine
industrial sectors, Rizk, Dixon, and Woodhead (2008) documented some differences in social and environmental
disclosure among Egyptian ﬁrms and the importance of ownership structure in reporting decision.
Wahba (2008b) found that ﬁrm's environmental policy has exerted a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on
institutional ownership. However, when an interaction term between environmental policy and ﬁnancial performance
is included, the results veriﬁed that environmental policy has a neutral impact on the preferences of institutional
investors. Moreover, by classifying ﬁrms into two subgroups, according to their ﬁnancial performance, environ-
mental policy was found to have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on institutional ownership only when ﬁnancial
performance is high. In addition, the ﬁndings of Wahba (2010) revealed that Egyptian institutional investors are more
likely to use environmental policy to offset their inability to confront managerial discretionary power. The study
concludes that not only different types of stakeholders will ask for different levels of environmental orientation, but
also the same type of stakeholder may ask for different levels of environmental orientation in different contexts.3. Hypothesis development
The key argument in this paper is that corporate social responsibility is expected to affect ﬁnancial performance
positively (negatively), which, in turn, attracts (repels) institutional investors. The positive effect of social
responsibility, in fact, on ﬁnancial performance is based on two premises. First, there is a trade-off relationship
between the ﬁrm's explicit costs (e.g., payments to bondholders) and the ﬁrm's implicit costs to other stakeholders
(e.g., pollution control cost) (Wood, 1991; Wood & Jones, 1995). Thus, if the ﬁrm decides to lower its implicit cost
by behaving in a socially irresponsible way, it will incur higher explicit costs, which will result in a competitive
disadvantage (Waddock & Graves, 1997). As a result, the expected payoff of corporate social responsibility may
outweigh the initial cost.
Second, ﬁrms, according to the raising rivals' costs theory, have different strategies to increase the cost of their
competitors. One of these strategies is to use differentiation to create unique reputation that cannot be easily imitated
(McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). Put simply, corporate social responsibility creates some organizational
capabilities that enable ﬁrms to achieve competitive advantages, such as being the ﬁrst mover in the industry (Preston
and O'Bannon, 1997; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Thus, by investing in superior social
responsibility, a ﬁrm builds up a stock of reputational capital, and hence boosts its ﬁnancial performance.
On the other hand, the premise of the negative effect of social responsibility on ﬁnancial performance is that the
expected cost of social responsibility is likely to outweigh the resulting beneﬁts (Friedman, 1970). Put simply, ﬁrms
that invest in social activities and programs will incur costs that can be easily avoided and hence they will incur
competitive disadvantage. For instance, those ﬁrms that spend money on some pollution control instruments will
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it is the government's responsibility (Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatﬁeld, 1985).
Better (or worse) ﬁnancial performance, and rather social responsibility, may, in turn, be the reference guide for
institutional investors when they make their investment decision. We draw this proposition from existing evidence in
literature that veriﬁes, ﬁrst, that managers of these institutions are evaluated and compensated for their short-term
results (Cox et al., 2004; Graves & Waddock, 1994), whereas investing in social responsibility programs and
initiatives is likely to lead to considerable costs in the short term (Hart & Ahuja, 1996), and the market often values
social responsibility characteristics in the long-term (Shank et al., 2005). Second, a very few institutional investors
take social and environmental information into account when making their investment decisions (Hummels &
Timmer, 2004). For instance, Matterson (2000) revealed that although many investors have valued social and
environmental responsibility, ﬁnancial performance was still their main concern. A ﬁnding that is consistent with not
only the work of Sparkes (1998) who pointed out that ﬁnancial returns are important for ethical investors, but also the
conclusion of Teoh and Shiu (1990) who revealed that available data on social responsibility in company reports
have no impact on decisions of institutional investors unless they are presented in a “ﬁnancial form”.
Third, institutional investors may own stocks of ﬁrms not only because of their social and environmental
reputation, but also for their ﬁnancial performance (Johnson & Greening, 1999). This is because “socially responsible
investors are clearly not interested in considering unproﬁtable investment options or paying a signiﬁcant penalty for
ethical choices, since ﬁnancial return remains an important consideration” (Michelson et al., 2004, p. 5). Put in
another way, “while the emergence of social criteria may inﬂuence institutional investment activity, these criteria
probably remain subordinate to economic criteria” (Coffey & Fryxell, 1991, p. 439). For instance, in studying the
effect of social responsibility on institutional shareholdings, Cox et al. (2004) reported a positive and signiﬁcant
impact of corporate ﬁnancial performance on institutional ownership and concluded that “ﬁnancial performance
attributes also play an important role in inﬂuencing institutional investors” (p. 38).
In short, the above discussion indicates that social responsibility is expected to enhance (detract from) ﬁrm
ﬁnancial performance, which, in turn, is likely to affect positively (negatively) institutional ownership. In fact,
identifying the positive or negative effect is a matter of empirical analysis. This argument is presented in Fig. 1: the
effect of corporate social responsibility on institutional investors (relation (c)) through a role of ﬁnancial performance
“mediation” (relation (a b)). We aim to test empirically our argument through the following hypothesis:H1. It is expected that the relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors will be mediated by
ﬁnancial performance.Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility
(CSR)
Institutional 
Investors
(INS)
Financial 
Performance
(ROA)
b
c
a
Fig. 1. The relationship between corporate social responsibility, ﬁnancial performance and institutional investors.
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The sample of this study includes Egyptian ﬁrms that are listed in the S&P/EGX Index for corporate social
responsibility (ESG Egypt), which is prepared and published by the Egyptian Corporate Responsibility Center
(ECRC). The Egyptian government represented by the Ministry of Investment, took the lead in developing the ESG
index in Egypt to encourage companies to be more transparent and to disclose their governance, social and
environmental practices more clearly to increase their competitive advantage. The index is being developed by a
consortium of Standard & Poor's, CRISIL and KLD. Standard & Poor's assisted the Egyptian Institute of Directors
(EIOD) in partnership with the Egyptian Stock Exchange to develop, calculate, publish and maintain an index
comprised of a capitalization weighted list of socially responsible companies which are publicly listed for trading on
the exchange. The index is based on quantitative factors as well as qualitative ones. Through the process,
environmental, social and corporate governance factors will be translated into a series of scores measuring securities
in the universe of publicly traded Egyptian companies (ECRC, 2012).
The S&P-EGX/ESG index determines annually the ranking of 30 best Egyptian ﬁrms, according to their social
programs, initiatives and activities. The sample covers all the ﬁrms that are included in the index from 2007 to 2010,
as the index was ﬁrst published in 2007. In fact, data after 2010 have not been included because of the occurrence of
the Egyptian revolution in January 2011, which, in turn, may lead to different conclusions.
The total number of ﬁrms in the sample is 38 with 149 observations during the period 2007–2010 and covers 12
different industrial sectors. Table 1 presents the distribution of ﬁrms according to their industrial sectors.
It may be argued that a sample size of 38 ﬁrms may limit the representativeness of the sample and generalizability
of the ﬁndings. Consequently, different tests were conducted to evaluate the internal and external validity of the
sample. First, the sample represents 14.15% of the total listed ﬁrms in 2010 (the total number of listed ﬁrms in the
EGX is 212 ﬁrms in 2010). Thus, the proportion of the sample size to the overall population is comparable to
previous research in the Egyptian context (see, for example, Wahba, 2008a, 2014). Second, to test for whether the
sample of the current study represents all listed ﬁrms in the EGX, the average of the total market capitalization during
2008–2010 for all companies listed in the EGX, as well as for those ﬁrms constituting the sample, is computed.
The average for all listed ﬁrms was LE 487.13 billion and reached LE 204 billion for the sample. Given that the
sample accounted for 41.8% of the total market capitalization of the entire market during 2008–2010, it can be
argued that the sample does represent the population (i.e., all ﬁrms listed in the Egyptian Exchange). This is also
comparable with prior work such as Abdel Shahid (2003) who used a sample that consists of the 90 most active ﬁrms
in the Egyptian context. Abdel Shahid revealed that the sample represents 44% of the total market capitalization and
is accounted for 87% of the total deals.
Third, analysis of variance (ANOVA) test as well as Kruskal–Wallis test was conducted to determine if there is
a signiﬁcant amount of variation among the industrial sectors. According to the results that are reported in Table 2,Table 1
Distribution of the sample according to industrial sectors.
Sector Firms (2007–2010)
N %
Construction & Materials 1 3
Telecommunications, Technology 4 11
Personal and household 3 8
Financial services (except Banks) 6 16
Chemicals 2 5
Banks 4 11
Industrial goods, services and Automobiles 5 13
Oil and gas 1 3
Real State 7 18
Basic Resources 3 8
Travel and Leisure 1 3
Food and Drinks 1 3
38 100
Table 2
ANOVA and Kruskal–Wallis of variables across the industrial sectors.
ANOVA (F) Kruskal–Wallis (χ2)
CSR 3.50nnn 31.29nnn
INS (%) 9.23nnn 52.79nnn
ROA (%) 8.66nnn 54.79nnn
SIZ 9.84nnn 60.12nnn
AGE 6.73nnn 53.05nnn
LEV (%) 3.81nnn 55.23nnn
DIV 2.92nn 12.46
LIQ (%) 2.39n 43.81nnn
CAP (%) 1.50 77.11nnn
npo0.05.
nnpo0.01.
nnnpo0.001.
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investors and return on assets have F-statistics (χ2-statistics) of 3.50 (31.34), 9.23 (52.79), and 8.66 (54.79),
respectively at 1% signiﬁcance level. Fourth, the key variables in the sample were compared with variables' means
that are reported in prior work to check for external validity. For instance, the T-statistic for the difference between
institutional ownership in this study and what is reported in Elsayed and Wahba (2013) is 0.0907 (p¼0.3661).
These ﬁndings give supportive evidence for applicability of the current sample.
The main dependent variable is institutional ownership (INS) that is measured by the fraction of common shares
owned by institutional investors (Cox et al., 2004; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999). The main
independent variable is corporate social responsibility (CSR), which, as explained above, is expressed by the ranking
of Egyptian ﬁrms in the S&P/EGX Index for corporate social responsibility (ESG Egypt). The S&P/EGX index
assigns ranks from (1) to (30), as lower value means a better social responsibility. For ease of presentation and
explanation, annual ranks are reversed so that higher values mean better rather than worse. The proposed mediating
variable is ﬁnancial performance. Although there is a wide literature on the appropriate measurement of performance,
and this literature has led to little consensus on the best approach to take, ﬁnancial performance, in this study, is
expressed by return on assets as it reﬂects the operating results rather than decisions of capital structure
(Schmalensee, 1989). Return on assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing ﬁrm proﬁts before taxes by its total assets
(Cox et al., 2004; Wahba & Elsayed, 2014b).
The study controls several variables that might confound the relationship between social responsibility, ﬁnancial
performance, and institutional investors. Following previous work (Cox et al., 2004; Elsayed, 2006; Graves &
Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Wahba, 2010), control variables include ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, ﬁnancial
leverage, dividend per share, liquidity, capital intensity, and industry heterogeneity.
Firm size (SIZ) is a relevant variable that could confound the relationship between social responsibility and
institutional investors for several alternative arguments. First, large ﬁrms are likely to have more resources and that
enhances a ﬁrm's ability to possess and process social information, which in turn gives the ﬁrm more competitive
advantages (Russo & Fouts, 1997). Second, ﬁrm size may reﬂect the legitimacy principle, or to what extent the ﬁrm
is visible to the public and this is because a large ﬁrm is either seen as industry leader (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996),
or is likely to have more environmental risk (Cohen, Fenn, & Konar, 1995). Third, it is argued also that ﬁrm size
could moderate the relationship between social strategy and stakeholder orientation (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003).
Finally, ﬁrm size has been related to the existence of scale economies inherent in social oriented investments
(Chapple, Morrison, & Harris, 2005; Elsayed & Paton, 2005). Firm size is represented by the ﬁrm total assets
(Wahba, 2015). The natural logarithm is employed to transform ﬁrm size, as the Shapiro–Wilk W test for normality is
signiﬁcant (W¼0.681, po0.001).
Firm age (AGE) is also controlled for as management problems and principles are rooted in time (Greiner, 1972).
Further, controlling for ﬁrm age is becoming important on the base that the more developed the ﬁrm, the greater is
the likelihood that problems associated with path dependency will hinder strategic change in the ﬁrm (Henderson and
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Wahba, 2013).
Financial leverage (RSK) is employed in the literature (e.g., Waddock & Grave, 1997) as a proxy for the risk. It is
used to reﬂect management's risk tolerance that inﬂuences its attitude towards social activities and measured by the
ratio of total debt to total assets. Dividend per share (DIV) is included to reﬂect available investment opportunities
(Wahba, 2010), and measured by the total dividend paid to ordinary shares divided by number of ordinary shares.
Liquidity (LIQ) is added to control for managerial discretion regarding social initiatives and programs (Elsayed &
Paton, 2009), and proxied by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Capital intensity (CAP) is also included
as a control variable for the expected relationship between capital intensity and social investment decision (Rust &
Rothwell, 1995). Capital intensity is measured by the ratio between payments in ﬁxed assets and the ﬁrm's total
assets. Controlling for industry effects (SIC) is also important as product differentiation may depend on the industry
to which the ﬁrm belongs (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Consequently, the study supplements the models by
experimenting with the inclusion of dummy variables for each two-digit standard industrial classiﬁcation (SIC) code.
Variables descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.
5. Econometric analysis
To examine whether ﬁnancial performance mediates the relationship between social responsibility and institutional
investors, we used Baron and Kenny's (1986) regression approach, while taking into our consideration the recent
critique and modiﬁcations suggested by Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010). According to Baron and Kenny (1986),
testing for mediation effect can be done in three steps: ﬁrst, regressing the mediator on the independent variables.
Second, regressing the dependent variable on the independent variables. Third, regressing the dependent variable on
both the independent variables and mediator. They pointed out that the independent variable in the ﬁrst two models is
expected to show a statistical signiﬁcance, while the third model is expected to show a statistical signiﬁcance of the
mediator variable and the insigniﬁcance of the independent variable.
Recently, Zhao et al. (2010) demonstrated that the signiﬁcant relationship between independent variable and
dependent variable is not necessary and can be misleading. This is because it represents the total effect of the sum of
direct and indirect effects, including the mediator, and that mediation must be only established by the existence of an
indirect effect. Put simply, to demonstrate mediation “all that matters is that the indirect effect is signiﬁcant” (Zhao
et al., 2010, p. 204). Thus, the following two models of analysis are employed to test for the mediation effect of
ﬁnancial performance, according to the main hypothesis in this study.
ROAit1 ¼ αþb1CSRit2þb2SIZit1þb3AGEit1þb4LEVit1
þb5DIVit1þb6LIQit1þb7CAPit1þb8SICiþμiþvit
INSit ¼ αþb1CSRit2þb2ROAit1þb3SIZitþb4AGEitþb5LEVit
þb6DIVitþb7LIQitþb8CAPitþb9SICiþμiþvit
where (α) is a constant and (b1 : b9) are the parameters for the explanatory variables. The subscript (i) refers to the
ﬁrm number and the subscript (t) denotes the time period. (μi) is the unobservable individual heterogeneity, and (vit)Table 3
Variables descriptive statistics.
Mean SD 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
CSR 15.87 8.51 8 16 23
INS (%) 33.53 24.09 16 32.4 52
ROA (%) 7.73 9.36 2.52 5.40 10.40
SIZ 21.51 2.18 19.87 21.74 23.20
AGE 26.41 19.68 12 22.5 33
LEV (%) 55.98 40.60 28.65 56.83 71.79
DIV 3.09 20.33 0 0 1
LIQ (%) 3.69 8.18 1.13 1.36 2.92
CAP (%) 20.82 20.29 1.28 14.68 34.56
Table 4
The impact of social responsibility on institutional investors: the mediating effect of ﬁnancial performance.
Model 1 (Mediator¼ROA) Model 2 (Dependent variable¼INS)
CSR 0.461nnn (0.038) 0.049 (0.157)
ROA 0.950nn (0.353)
SIZ 1.123nnn (0.245) 6.72nnn (1.514)
AGE 0.006 (0.030) 0.899nnn (0.154)
LEV 0.036nnn (0.008) 0.192nnn (0.053)
DIV 0.089nnn (0.007) 0.145n (0.063)
LIQ 0.060 (0.038) 1.02nnn (0.126)
CAP 0.147 (0.087) 19.69 (14.01)
Industry effects (F-test) 225.96nnn 390.78nnn
Wald (χ2) 1306.9nnn 2035.9nnn
F-test 1.64n 10.04nnn
B–P LM test 4.85n 42.01nnn
Hausman 10.79 6.60
Heteroscedasticity 43,985.2nnn 2.0eþ06nnn
Serial correlation 67.92nnn 91.84nnn
CSR (predicted value) test 1.62 0.16
ROA (predicted value) test 1.40
(i) *po0.05; **po0.01; ***po0.001.
(ii) Figures in brackets are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.
(iii) F-test provides a test of the pooled OLS model against the ﬁxed effects model based on the OLS residuals.
(iv) B–P LM test is the Breusch and Pagan's (1980) Lagrange Multiplier statistic that provides a test of the pooled OLS model against the random
effects model based on the OLS residuals.
(v) Hausman is the Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test for ﬁxed effects over random effects.
(vi) Wald is the Wald test (χ2) for model goodness-of-ﬁt.
(vii) Heteroscedasticity is the modiﬁed Wald statistic for group-wise heteroscedasticity (Greene, 2003).
(viii) Serial correlation is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel-data models (Wooldridge, 2002).
(ix) CSR test and ROA test are χ2-tests for expected endogeneity.
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and time.
The Hausman speciﬁcation test (Hausman, 1978) was applied to test for whether corporate social responsibility,
institutional ownership and return on assets can be considered as endogenous variables or not. Following the
recommendation of Gujarati (2003), the predicted values of corporate social responsibility, institutional ownership
and return on assets were estimated and used with original values as well as other control variables as explained
above. The χ2-statistics for the predicted values of corporate social responsibility and return on assets, as reported in
Table 4, were not signiﬁcant. Thus, corporate social responsibility, institutional ownership and return on assets can
be treated as exogenous variables.
The above stated models of analysis, in which return on assets and institutional ownership are treated as dependent
variables, were estimated using panel data regression. For panel data estimates, the F-test (Baltagi, 1995) and the
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test (B–P) were performed to decide between pooled regression and
the alternatives of panel data (i.e., ﬁxed and random effects, respectively). According to the results that are reported
in Table 4, both tests are signiﬁcant. The implication of these results is that the ﬁxed effects model and the random
effects model are preferred to the pooled model. Thus, the Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test was conducted to
decide between the ﬁxed effect model and the random effect model. The Hausman test, as reported in Table 4, was
insigniﬁcant in all cases. This implies that the random effects model is preferred to the ﬁxed effects model, under any
case (Baltagi, 1995; Greene, 2003).
Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are two serious problems that can affect the estimate of the random effects
model. The presence of these problems means that the standard errors associated with each regression coefﬁcient will
not be correct (Gujarati, 2003). Therefore, the modiﬁed Wald test (Greene, 2003) and the Wooldridge (2002) test
were performed to check for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, respectively, and the results are reported in
Table 4. The results show that heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are present in all cases. Therefore, the
H. Wahba, K. Elsayed / Future Business Journal 1 (2015) 1–12 9generalized least squares (GLS) method was employed to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in all
models (Hausman, 1978).
According to results that are reported in Table 4, corporate social responsibility, as an independent variable, affects
the mediator variable (return on assets), under Model 1, negatively and signiﬁcantly (0.461, po0.001). When
return on assets and corporate social responsibility, as well as control variables, are included in Model 2, it is found
that corporate social responsibility (relation (c) in Fig. 1) has no signiﬁcant direct effect (0.049, p40.10), while
return on assets has exerted a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (0.950, po0.01) on institutional ownership.
Thus, the indirect effect ((a b) in Fig. 1) is 0.438. The conservative Sobel–Goodman test for the indirect effect
showed that the effect of corporate social responsibility of institutional ownership through its indirect effect via return
on assets is signiﬁcant (Z¼2.639, p¼0.008).
The bootstrap test (with 5000 bootstrap samples), which offers a much more alternative that imposes no
distributional assumption (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Zhao et al., 2010), is employed to test the mediation effect of
return on assets between corporate social responsibility and institutional ownership. The results show that the indirect
effect is positive and signiﬁcant with a bias corrected 95% conﬁdence intervals excluding zero (0.136, 0.829).
According to Zhao et al. (2010), these results suggest indirect-only mediation, because the indirect effect (a b) is
signiﬁcant, but (c) is not, and give support evidence for applicability of the main hypothesis in this study.
6. Conclusion and implications
Existing literature is inconclusive about the relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors as
it assumes, implicitly, that this relationship is direct. An alternative perspective, that has received less attention in the
literature, is that this relationship can be mediated by other contextual variables such as ﬁnancial performance. Thus,
this study is aiming to provide some empirical evidence on this issue that may help in explaining divergence in
prior work.
Results of panel data analysis showed that ﬁnancial performance mediates the effect of social responsibility on
institutional investors. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁndings demonstrated that social responsibility affects ﬁnancial performance
negatively, which, in turn, affects institutional investors also negatively. Put simply, the results demonstrate that
better (or worse) ﬁnancial performance, and rather social responsibility, is the lead for institutional investors when
they make their investment decisions. The implication of this ﬁnding is that ﬁnancial performance plays an important
mediating role in the relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors. Thus, overlooking that the
relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors is probably subordinate to economic criteria may
result in spurious conclusions.
This study, to the best of our knowledge, is the ﬁrst one that offers empirical evidence regarding the effect of
mediating effect of ﬁnancial performance on the relationship between social responsibility and institutional investors.
Moreover, the paper adds to the corporate ﬁnance literature by providing empirical evidence from Egypt as an
emerging market, where much of the existing evidence comes from more developed countries.
The ﬁndings of this paper have some implications for practitioners and academic research. For practitioners, if it is
true that both ethically-oriented and non-ethically-oriented investors are interested in ﬁnancial performance, then
managers will have a great opportunity to optimize their ﬁrms' attractiveness in the eyes of investors, especially
institutions investors, by justifying their social programs and activities in a ﬁnancial form. In other words, managers
should seek to establish ﬁnancial motivations for their social orientation. This is, in fact, a very important issue as “in
the absence of strong ﬁnancial motivations, some institutions may be reacting to a current need to look socially
responsible by making small or token investment in high-CSP [corporate social performance] companies” (Graves
and Waddock, 1994, p. 1044).
The ﬁndings of this study open some directions for future work in corporate ﬁnance literature. Future studies are
invited to investigate the mediating effect of ﬁnancial performance on the relationship between social responsibility
and institutional investors in other contexts or countries. This becomes very important not only because “socially
responsible investment has no universal principles” (McLachlan & Gardner, 2004, p. 20), and corporate social
responsibility has often “a location-speciﬁc context” (Welford, Chan, & Man, 2008), but also because the inﬂuence
of institutional investors varies with country speciﬁcations (Seifert, Gonenc, & Wright, 2005), as national institutions
may allocate power within ﬁrms in a different way (Aguilera, 2005). This direction is expected also
to add value to our understanding with the increase in the adoption of corporate social programs and initiatives.
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encourage companies to be more socially responsible.
Furthermore, the signiﬁcant effect of industry heterogeneity that is reported in this paper demonstrates that
studying the effect of industry type on investors' perception toward corporate social responsibility is another
promising area for future research. In fact, this is an important issue as some investors may not desire to invest, for
example, in the tobacco industry as a result of their ethical orientation, while this industry for many other investors is
an “uncontrolled ﬁnancial risk” (Hummels & Timmer, 2004).
Institutional investors may engage in social programs and initiatives to protect their investment, but in different
ways. For instance, they are more likely to utilize social responsibility as a tool to legitimize their existence and
operations, conform with the industry's norms or lessen managerial discretion (Wahba, 2010). Thus, future studies
are also invited to examine how the relationship between corporate social responsibility and institutional investors
varies with the effect of any non-ﬁnancial motivations. Moreover, since social activities may become, for example,
an effective managerial entrenchment strategy (Cespa & Cestone, 2007), future studies are needed to investigate the
relationship between other types of ownership (such as managerial ownership and foreign shareholding) and
corporate social responsibility.References
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